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What is the Rule of Law Good For?
Democracy, Development, and the Rule of
Law in Classical Athens
FEDERICA CARUGATI†
INTRODUCTION
In nome del popolo italiano la Suprema Corte di Cassazione,
sezione feriale, ha emesso all’udienza pubblica del procedimento
penale numero 27.884-2013, iscritto al numero 8 dell’udienza
pubblica del 30 luglio 2013 la seguente decisione: . . . annulla la
sentenza impugnata nei confronti di Silvio Berlusconi
limitatamente alla statuizione relativa alla condanna alle pena
accessoria per l’interdizione temporanea per anni 5 dai pubblici
uffici per violazione dell’art. 12, comma 2, decreto legislativo 10
marzo 2000 n. 74 e dispone trasmettersi gli atti ad altra sezione
della corte d’appello di Milano perché ridetermini la pena
accessoria nei limiti temporali fissati dal citato articolo 12, ai sensi
dell’art. 133 codice penale, valutazione non consentita alla Corte di
legittimità. Rigetta nel resto il ricorso del Berlusconi nei cui
confronti dichiara, ai sensi dell’articolo 624 comma 2 codice
procedura penale, irrevocabili tutte le altre parti della sentenza
impugnata.1

† Ph.D. Candidate, Classics, Stanford University; M.A. Candidate, Political
Science, Stanford University; M.A. Political Philosophy, University of Bologna,
Italy; B.A. Philosophy, University of Bologna, Italy. I wish to thank Paul
Gowder for inviting me to contribute to this issue of the Buffalo Law Review;
Josh Ober, Adriaan Lanni, and Andrea Nightingale for helpful comments on
earlier drafts of this paper; Andrea Carugati for his knowledge of Italian politics
and his willingness to share it with me; and Sara Forsdyke and Mirko Canevaro
for granting me permission to cite their unpublished works.
1. Silvio Berlusconi Condannato: Sentenza Mediaset, Interdizione da
Ricalcolare, L'HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 8, 2013, 10:47 PM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.it/2013/08/01/silvio-berlusconi-condannato-processomediaset_n_3688851.html#29_la-lettura-delle-sentenzamediaset-video.
In simple terms, the conviction verdict confirmed a four-year jail term for Silvio
Berlusconi while returning the final decision on the length of the ban on public
office to another court. Id. From an initial five years, the ban was cut to two
years on October 19, 2013. See Ilaria Polleschi, Italy Court Bans Berlusconi from
Public Office for Two Years, REUTERS (Oct. 19, 2013, 8:51 AM),
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With this barely comprehensible declaration, on August
1, 2013 at 7:48 p.m., the Italian Corte di Cassazione (High
Court) definitively convicted Italy’s ex-Premier Silvio
Berlusconi of tax fraud and sentenced him to prison in the
Mediaset2 trial. The words above are legalese that
vindicates the frustration caused by two decades of failures
and it doesn’t matter (or it matters less) that a series of
other debatable laws will de facto prevent Silvio from ever
setting foot inside a jail cell.3
The series of papers appearing in the present edition of
the Buffalo Law Review deal with the ‘Rule of Law in
Athens.’ As an Italian writing on the Rule of Law (RoL), the
temptation to begin with a preamble about Italy’s Cavaliere
is simply too tempting to resist. But there is more to this
choice.
One may say that on August 1, 2013, the Corte di
Cassazione returned to Italy a principle that stands at the
very heart of ancient and modern formulations of the RoL:
the principle that “law binds a society’s rulers as well as its
citizens”—a principle also known as legal supremacy.4
Stating that the Corte di Cassazione ‘returned to Italy
the RoL,’ however, may well sound like an exaggeration.
The RoL is a broad and multifaceted concept and there is
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/19/us-italy-berlusconi-idUSBRE99
I01T20131019.
2. As the New York Times concisely explained it, Berlusconi was convicted
on “charges of buying the rights to broadcast American movies on his Mediaset
networks through a series of offshore companies and falsely declaring how much
they paid to avoid taxes.” Rachel Donadio, Italian Court Upholds Berlusconi
Sentence, Setting Stage for Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2013, at A4.
3. Through a series of laws, Berlusconi was able to decriminalize his
offenses and postpone his trials, obtaining, in most cases, acquittal because the
statute of limitations had expired. The Italian journalist Marco Travaglio has
collected and discussed all the ‘leges ad personam’ passed since 1994 in the book
Ad Personam. MARCO TRAVAGLIO, AD PERSONAM (2010). A summary was
published in an Italian newspaper. See Marco Travaglio, Tutte Le Leggi ‘Ad
Personam’ Di Berlusconi, IL FATTO QUOTIDIANO (Mar. 12, 2010) (It.), available at
http://www.meetup.com/sanremobeppegrillomeetup/pages/TUTTE_LE_LEGGI_'
AD_PERSONAM'_DI_BERLUSCONI.
4. Peter F. Nardulli et al., Conceptualizing and Measuring Rule of Law
Constructs, 1850-2010, 1 J.L. & CTS. 139, 147 (2013) (defining legal supremacy).
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generally little agreement on its constituent elements. With
one seeming exception: the principle of legal supremacy.
Legal supremacy is, in fact, the lowest common
denominator in debates over the RoL in fields as
(apparently) disparate as Political Science and Classics.
Nardulli et al.’s useful review of eighteen among the most
prominent first-generation RoL measures identifies seven
that employ legal supremacy as a parameter.5 With seven
out of eighteen occurrences, legal supremacy is the second
most popular measure after judicial independence, which
occurs ten out of eighteen times.6 Analogously, in the field of
Classics, the principle of legal supremacy is widely
accepted—at least if we define legal supremacy, as I did
above, as the idea that law ought to establish checks on
official abuse of power.7
In the absence of an agreement on what RoL is (in
Athens as elsewhere), my argument starts from the basic
definition of RoL qua legal supremacy and hopes to move
beyond this basic definition. I hope, first, to clarify some
conceptual inconsistencies that have thwarted the
development of a definition of RoL in Athens. Second, I
purport to broaden the scope of the debate over the RoL in
Athens.

5. Id. at 153-60.
6. Id. Among classical scholars, the debate revolves around the doctrine of
separation of powers, which is inherently related to the principle of judicial
independence. See, e.g., JOSIAH OBER, MASS AND ELITE IN DEMOCRATIC ATHENS:
RHETORIC, IDEOLOGY, AND THE POWER OF THE PEOPLE (1989) [hereinafter OBER,
MASS AND ELITE]; Josiah Ober, The Nature of Athenian Democracy, 84 CLASSICAL
PHILOLOGY 322 (1989) [hereinafter Ober, Nature] (reviewing MOGENS HERMAN
HANSEN, THE ATHENIAN ASSEMBLY IN THE AGE OF DEMOSTHENES (1987)). Here
Ober notes that the absence of an entrenched bureaucracy, the fact that, as
Hansen himself demonstrated, “government bodies were staffed by large
numbers of amateurs—citizens chosen more or less at random from the whole
social spectrum” weakens the thesis of the separation of powers. Ober, Nature,
supra, at 327. Contra MOGENS HERMAN HANSEN, THE ATHENIAN ASSEMBLY IN THE
AGE OF DEMOSTHENES (1987); Mogens Herman Hansen, Initiative and Decision:
The Separation of Powers in Fourth-Century Athens, 22 GREEK, ROMAN, &
BYZANTINE STUD. 345 (1981).
7. See discussion infra Part IV.
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I return momentarily to the example of Italy under
Berlusconi because it helps me illustrate the scope I have in
mind. The question can be framed as follows: what does
‘having the RoL’ mean to Italy (assuming, or better, hoping,
that this first step made by the Corte di Cassazione will be
followed by others)? And, more importantly, what has ‘the
absence of the RoL’ meant to the country? In other words, if
we speak of RoL qua legal supremacy what are we actually
saying about a country—its values, its government, its
economy?
Perhaps little today: the story of Italy in the past few
decades has entertained many, especially outside of Europe.
We all laughed at (or, in some cases, with) Berlusconi at one
point or another and, in between fits, many pondered the
political longevity of a Prime Minister for whom the law (or
common decency, for that matter) has constituted a rather
loose check. Yet, despite the toll the recent crisis took on the
country, whether Italy has had or has been able to enforce
the RoL (qua legal supremacy) hasn’t mattered much for its
survival, stability and prosperity.
Using GDP as a measure of prosperity, Italy dropped
from fifth in 19948—that is, when Berlusconi ‘took the
field’—to ninth in 2012.9 Significantly, in the course of this
period, Italy was displaced by China, Brazil, and Russia—
hardly model countries in terms of the ability to control
their officials.10 A similar picture emerges from the United
Nations Development Programme’s Human Development
Index indicators, according to which, despite the drop from
the twenty-second to the twenty-fifth position, Italy remains
squarely within the group of countries with a “very high

8. Ranking of the World’s Richest Countries by GDP (1994), CLASSORA,
http://en.classora.com/reports/t24369/general/ranking-of-the-worlds-richestcountries-by-gdp (under the “Choose the edition” drop down list, select 1994)
(last updated July 15, 2013).
9. Ranking of the World’s Richest Countries by GDP (2012), CLASSORA,
http://en.classora.com/reports/t24369/general/ranking-of-the-worlds-richestcountries-by-gdp (under the “Choose the edition” drop down list, select 2012)
(last updated July 15, 2013).
10. Id.
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human development.”11 The last few years have been tough
for Italians but haven’t they been tough for others countries
(better countries, i.e., more RoL-abiding countries) as well?
Did Italy’s economy almost collapse in 2011 because of
Berlusconi’s disregard of the RoL? Did the Italian
democracy collapse because of that? The truth is that, even
for those of us (like me) who grew into political
consciousness through a rejection of ‘Berlusconi-style’
politics who would love to answer with an unqualified YES,
the answer is: not so much. So either the RoL doesn’t
matter, or RoL qua legal supremacy is only part of the
story.
The point of my opening vignette is that even today in
developed western European countries, RoL remains a
concept that can be understood in quite different ways and,
most of all, a concept that is not (by any definition)
universally practiced. Moreover, as political scientists know
all too well, the relationship between RoL and national
prosperity (whether measured by economic growth
indicators or otherwise) is not a simple correlation.
What, then, is RoL? And what is it good for? The
present Article attempts some basic ‘ground-clearing’ for the
work that I will carry out in more depth in my dissertation.
The Article shows that some common definitions of RoL are
not universally accepted (or applicable across all relevant
times and places) and suggests some reasons why the
question of what the RoL is good for needs to be reframed.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I discusses Paul
Gowder’s interpretation of RoL as guarantor of political
equality. Gowder’s points are to be warmly welcomed in the
debate over the RoL for two reasons. First, Gowder’s
philosophically-elaborate definition gives pride of place to a
pillar of the RoL that, in recent times, may have been too
hastily sacrificed to the altar of speedy measuring—the

11. UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1994, at
93 (1994), available at http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/255/
hdr_1994_en_complete_nostats.pdf; UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT REPORT SUMMARY 2013, at 16 (2013), available at
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr2013_en_summary.pdf.
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principle of equality among citizens.12 Second, Gowder’s
arguments are formulated at a moment when the
polarization of the debate over the RoL in ancient Athens is
such that the debate itself has become an object of study in
its own right. His thoughtful interpretation of RoL moves
the debate forward insofar as it revolves around a
fundamentally different question: not ‘did Athens have the
RoL?,’ but ‘what did the RoL do for Athens?,’ or as I framed
it, ‘what is the RoL good for?’
Before we can apply Gowder’s scheme to Athens,
however, we ought to clarify some important aspects
concerning the debate over the Athenian RoL. In Parts II
and III, I deal with a set of problems that I perceive as
harmful to a constructive interpretation of the concept of
RoL in Athens.
Part II presents an overview of the debate over the RoL
in Athens from its conceptual antecedent—the notion of
sovereignty of law. Through a comparison between two
important constitutional debates, one in ancient Athens, the
other in early modern England, the section reflects on the
limitations of framing our questions on the role and
function of law in Athens in terms of sovereignty. As a
result, the narrative aims at exposing the risks that the
‘burden of sovereignty’ carries for the idea of RoL in Athens
as well as elsewhere.
Part III reflects on codification and centralized
enforcement as bogeymen of modern conceptions of RoL. I
suggest that unwritten law and decentralized enforcement
run counter to the idea of RoL only insofar as we take
modern developed countries (particularly the United States)
as comparanda. Broadening the perspective to the
12. Despite the fact that Nardulli et al.’s definition of RoL posits the principle
of equality before the law as a fundamental expressive ideal on a par with the
principle of legal supremacy, equality before the law occurs only once among
first-generation measures. See Nardulli et al., supra note 4, at 144-46, 153-60.
Conversely, Classical scholars agree on the preeminence of isonomia among the
Greeks, though they debate whether isonomia specifically meant political or
legal equality. For an overview of previous scholarship on this topic, see Paul
Gowder, Democracy, Solidarity and the Rule of Law: Lessons from Athens, 62
BUFF. L. REV. 1, 21-22 (2013). See infra Part I for further exploration of
Gowder’s scholarship.
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developing world, I use the example of Sierra Leone as an
alternative for a better understanding of the place of
unwritten law and decentralized enforcement in Athens.
Having cleared this ground, in Part IV I suggest an
alternative horizon for the Athenian RoL. Without
exceptions, accounts of RoL in Athens remain squarely
within the boundaries of the political, if not the legal,
domain. As a result, Athenian citizens are perceived in a
vacuum, like brains in a vat, as if the many non-citizens
that pullulated the alleys of Athens and the roads of Attica
did not count or did not matter for the stability (and
prosperity) of the polis.
The appearance of metics, foreigners, and slaves in the
law courts has begun to receive increasing—albeit
contested13—attention since the pioneering works of
Adriaan Lanni and Edward Cohen.14 It is with these
important contributions in mind that I reflect on the
political and economic bargains that presided over the
pacification of a newly empire-less Athens as foundational
to Athenian development in the fourth century.
The high-stakes political and economic bargains that
presided
over
the
pacification
of
Athens,
the
reestablishment of the democracy, and the economic
recovery of the polis revolved around the problems of
violence and limited resources. Recent work with emerging
economies suggests that in the aftermath of economic and
political crises, the tendency is to ready recourse, to step
back, and to diminish expectations.15 Conversely, in 404/3
13. For a complete bibliography on the legal standing of slaves, foreigners,
and metics, see Virginia Hunter, Introduction: Status Distinctions in Athenian
Law, in LAW AND SOCIAL STATUS IN CLASSICAL ATHENS 5-23 (Virginia Hunter &
Jonathan Edmondson eds., 2000) and, more recently, DEBORAH KAMEN, STATUS
IN CLASSICAL ATHENS 19-31, 43-54 (2013).
14. See generally EDWARD E. COHEN, ATHENIAN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: A
BANKING PERSPECTIVE (1992); ADRIAAN LANNI, LAW AND JUSTICE IN THE COURTS
OF CLASSICAL ATHENS (2006).
15. Both domestic and foreign policy reasons support this point. As Jeremy
Weinstein and Kosuke Imai show, “the driving force behind the negative effects
of civil war on economic growth is a decrease in domestic investment, and in
particular, private investment.” Kosuke Imai & Jeremy M. Weinstein,
Measuring the Economic Impact of Civil War 1 (CID Ctr. Int’l Dev. Harv. Univ.,
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and in the years thereafter, Athens did not shy away from
the conspicuous investments that recovery required. Such
investments targeted the infrastructure and manpower of
Athenian trade and commercial prosperity and ranged from
the reconstruction of the Long Walls and the dockyards of
Piraeus to the extension of legal access to key economic
actors.16 The fact that these investments contributed to
lower the stakes of politics by raising the cost of fighting
may help explain Athenian success in the long run.
My contribution is different from previous analyses
because it looks at legal change from the perspective of the
inextricable political and economic processes that fostered
that change. Moreover, by taking politics and economics as
a bundle, my perspective moves beyond the usual
suspects—the citizens of Athens, their institutions and
domestic policy—and focuses on larger socioeconomic and
political changes within Hellas.
Studying the ancient past—a world on which our
actions have no bearing—ought to free us, if not from
ideological constraints, at least from the fear of ‘getting it
wrong’—a luxury that few disciplines can afford. For this
reason, reflecting on the RoL in ancient Athens, an
unparalleled laboratory for theorists of democracy and law,
has the potential to teach us much about important topics
such as the occurrence of civil war, the emergence and
persistence of a legal order, the stability of democracy, and
their relationship to processes of development—topics to
which modern debates over the RoL are intrinsically (and
Working Paper No. 51, 2000). The structural adjustment programs implemented
in Sub-Saharan Africa that followed the debt crisis in the 1980s and the
crippling austerity measures recently imposed by the European Union on
Greece (and other countries in the Eurozone) are cases in point.
16. The investments began with the speedy reconstruction of the Long Walls
and the dockyards of Piraeus. See XENOPHON, Hellenica, in 2 XENOPHON bk. 4,
ch. 8, § 9 (Carleton L. Brownson trans., 1921) (Xen. Hell. 4.8.9), available at
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.
0206%3Abook%3D4%3Achapter%3D8%3Asection%3D9; see also Josiah Ober &
Barry Weingast, Is Development Uniquely Modern? Athens on the Doorstep, 2829 (Int’l Soc’y for New Inst’l Econ., Paper, 2013), http://extranet.isnie.org/
uploads/isnie2013/ober_weingast.pdf. For a further elaboration on Athenian
investment in Piraeus, see infra Part IV.
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importantly) related. My hope is that the story I tell in my
dissertation—the story of how law contributed to the
success of Athens in her struggle against political instability
and limited resources—may be of interest to contemporary
theorists and practitioners of the RoL.
I. ROL AS POLITICAL EQUALITY
Gowder has recently put forth a constructive
interpretation of the meaning and the role of RoL.
According to Gowder’s definition, RoL fosters political
equality among citizens, and it does so by satisfying three
conditions—regularity, publicity, and generality.17 Gowder
sees such construction as readily applicable to the history of
the development of the RoL in Athens.18
Weaving the debates over the place of law in Athens
within the interpretive framework of Athenian politics and
society put forth by Ober,19 Gowder argues that, in a society
divided between masses and elites, law constituted a
weapon in the hands of the masses to regulate elite power. 20
In particular, Athens satisfied the principles of regularity
and publicity while lacking the principle of generality for
reasons that are easy to dismiss in historical perspective,
such as the exclusion from political rights of women,
foreigners, and slaves.21 As a result, Athens achieved a weak
version of the RoL by securing vertical equality between

17. Gowder, supra note 12, at 10-22; see also Paul Gowder, The Rule of Law
and Equality, 32 LAW & PHIL. 565 (2013).
18. Gowder, supra note 12, at 12-22.
19. See generally OBER, MASS AND ELITE, supra note 6. In the past few
decades, quantitative work on real wages, demography, and economic
development has produced a body of evidence that compels us to put pressure on
the validity of the dichotomy between masses and elites in practice, if not in
ideology. Yet, such dichotomy remains a centerpiece of our understanding of
Athenian politics and society. Unpacking its limits remains one of the goals of
my dissertation.
20. Gowder, supra note 12, at 10-22.
21. Id.
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officials and ordinary citizens, thus avoiding terror and
hubris (albeit not legal caste).22
Gowder’s arguments are well taken, and his normative
focus on political equality at the root of the RoL is
important in two ways: first, it contributes to bring
‘equality’ back into the discussion over the RoL in fields
beyond the reach of Classics; second, it moves the debate
over the Athenian RoL forward insofar as it answers a
fundamental question that, in recent debates, strikes one
for its absence: what is the RoL good for?
However, before applying Gowder’s elaboration to
Athens, some points of clarification are necessary. First, I
address the confusion between the overlapping concepts of
sovereignty of law and RoL. At a glance, the principle of
sovereignty of law can be taken to mean, to quote Gowder,
“something equivalent to the [RoL].”23 The distinction
Gowder draws between constitutionalism and sovereignty of
law/RoL24 is helpful insofar as it is functional to Gowder’s
own definition of RoL as the guarantor of political equality.
Yet, such distinction overlooks an important aspect of the
equation between RoL and sovereignty of law in Athens
(and elsewhere) that deserves specific mention. I will
discuss the problem of sovereignty in Part II.
Second, I address the problems of codification and
enforcement of law in the context of modern conceptions of
the RoL. In his discussion of the principles of regularity and
publicity in Athens, Gowder rightly addresses the
widespread assumption that codification—that is, written
law—is a prerequisite for RoL arguments. Surely, as
Gowder concedes, the change that occurred in Athens in the
last years of the fifth century “from scattered and hard-todiscover laws to a centralized law code was a clear
improvement from the standpoint of publicity.”25 Yet, as
Gowder clarifies, through the examples of common law
countries such as modern Britain and the United States, the
22. Id.
23. Id. at 36.
24. Id. at 35-37.
25. Id. at 19.
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RoL does not require all the laws be written or codified. 26
This important clarification confirms how much the
diverging positions in the debate over the RoL in Athens
rest on different conceptions (and different definitions) of
RoL.
Gowder’s perspective, however, remains squarely within
the framework that compares and contrasts ancient Athens
to modern western developed countries (be it the United
States or Britain, where as Gowder puts it, “it has long been
argued that the common law is rooted in the custom of the
community”).27 In Part III, I suggest and briefly discuss a
set of reasons why these comparanda may be ultimately
misleading.
II. THE PROBLEM OF SOVEREIGNTY IN ATHENS
In order to discuss the problem of sovereignty in Athens
and its relation with the concept of RoL, I move, like others
have done before me, from Gagarin’s tripartite conception of
the conceptual pillars of the Athenian RoL—a conception
that well summarizes the history of the debate.28 These
pillars are:
1. The orderly and peaceful regulation of society according to a
set of authoritative rules as opposed to disorder and violence.
2. The principle that all are accountable to the law, and that no
one—not even a monarch or tyrant—is above the law.
3. The principle that laws should be clear in meaning and their
29
application consistent and predictable.

26. Id. at 16-17 & n.64.
27. Gowder, supra note 12, at 17 n.64.
28. Michael Gagarin, The Rule of Law in Gortyn, in THE LAW AND THE COURTS
ANCIENT GREECE 173 (Edward M. Harris & Lene Rubinstein eds., 2004); see
also Edward M. Harris, Did the Athenian Courts Attempt to Achieve
Consistency? Oral Tradition and Written Records in the Athenian
Administration of Justice, in POLITICS OF ORALITY 343, 343 (Craig Cooper ed.,
2007) [hereinafter Harris, POLITICS]; Sara Forsdyke, Rule of Law, Popular
Justice and the Politics of Interpreting the Past 3 (April 12, 2013) (unpublished
paper presented at EPAM workshop at Stanford) (on file with author).
IN

29. Forsdyke, supra note 28.
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The second principle coincides with the principle of legal
supremacy that I discussed in the introduction; in the
formulation that I offered in the introduction—i.e., that
“law binds a society’s rulers as well as its citizens.”30 As
Sara Forsdyke acknowledges in a recent article, “most
scholars would agree that the Athenians valued the [RoL] in
the second sense . . . .”31 However, as I argued above, legal
supremacy—on its own—tells us as little about ancient
Athens as it does about modern Italy. Moreover, as I will
argue below, there are reasons to question the nature of
such an uncritical agreement in those cases when legal
supremacy is confused with, or framed by, ill-defined
notions of sovereignty of law and RoL.
The third principle has become, in recent years, the
single most important focus around which debates over (the
rule of) law in Athens almost invariably revolve—with a
caveat. The question at hand is as follows: “Does Athens
have the RoL, if we define RoL as a set of attributes such as
30. See supra text accompanying note 4.
31. Forsdyke, supra note 28 (manuscript at 3). On specific procedures such as
graphe paranomon, graphe nomon me epitedeion theinai, and eisangelia, see
MOGENS HERMAN HANSEN, EISANGELIA: THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE PEOPLE’S COURT
IN ATHENS IN THE FOURTH CENTURY B.C. AND THE IMPEACHMENT OF GENERAL AND
POLITICIANS (1975); MOGENS HERMAN HANSEN, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE
PEOPLE’S COURT IN ATHENS IN THE FOURTH CENTURY B.C. AND THE PUBLIC ACTION
AGAINST UNCONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS 28-65 (Jørgen Raphaelsen & Sojna
Holbøll trans., 1974) [hereinafter HANSEN, SOVEREIGNTY OF THE PEOPLE’S
COURT]; Edwin Carawan, The Trial of the Arginousai Generals and the Dawn of
‘Judicial Review’, DIKE, 2007, at 19 (It.); Paul Cloché, Remarques sur L’Emploi
de la Graphè Paranomón, 38 REVUE DES ÉTUDES ANCIENNES 401 (1936) (FR.);
Ulrich Kahrstedt, Untersuchungen zu athenischen Behörden, 30 Kilo 10 (1937)
(Ger.); Adriaan Lanni, Judicial Review and the Athenian ‘Constitution’, in
DÉMOCRATIE ATHÉNIENNE—DÉMOCRATIE MODERNE: TRADITION ET INFLUENCE 235
(Mogens Herman Hansen, ed., 2010) (Switz.); Mark J. Sundahl, The Rule of Law
and the Nature of the Fourth-Century Athenian Democracy, 54 CLASSICA ET
MEDIAEVALIA 127 (2003) (Den.); Harvey Yunis, Law, Politics and the Graphe
Paranomon in Fourth-Century Athens, 29 GREEK, ROMAN, & BYZANTINE STUD.
361 (1988). On the principle of accountability for Athenian officials, see
JENNIFER TOLBERT ROBERTS, ACCOUNTABILITY IN ATHENIAN GOVERNMENT
(Warren G. Mood ed., 1982). More generally, on the ‘spirit’ of early Greek law,
its public nature, and anti-tyrannical origins, see MICHAEL GAGARIN, WRITING
GREEK LAW (2008); EDWARD M. HARRIS, Solon and the Spirit of the Law in
Archaic and Classical Greece, in DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW IN CLASSICAL
ATHENS 3, 3-28 (2006) [hereinafter HARRIS, DEMOCRACY].
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consistency, predictability, clarity etc.?”32 Assessing whether
Athens did or did not have the RoL in these terms may well
be a crucial step toward a better understanding of law as it
was theorized—but especially as it was practiced—in
Athens. However, it is important to recognize that such a
question makes sense only if we move from, and agree on,
the positivistic assumption that the essence of law is a set of
attributes.33
We may question such assumption on philosophical
grounds; we may agree with Ronald Dworkin that the
essence of law is the product of an interpretive contest not
reconcilable with a set of attributes and that the rules that
we call laws are not stuff that we can find, regardless of
how hard we look.34 However, if we frame the debate in this
way, which position one holds ultimately reflects one’s
intellectual preferences. Reflecting on the polarization
reached by the debate over the RoL in Athens, Forsdyke has
recently noted that conflicting approaches to the RoL
32. The attributes scholars examine are usually variants on the theme of
Fuller’s original list: generality, prospectivity, publicity, clarity, consistency,
feasibility, and stability. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39 (2d ed. 1969).
Consequently, the investigative focus has been directed toward questions such
as: was law in Athens substantively coherent? See, e.g., MOGENS HERMAN
HANSEN, THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF DEMOSTHENES 165 (J.A. Crook
trans., 1991) [hereinafter HANSEN, THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY]; S.C. TODD, THE
SHAPE OF ATHENIAN LAW 71-72, 167-340 (1993); Edward M. Harris, What Are the
Laws of Athens About? Substance and Procedure in Athenian Statutes, DIKE,
2009/2010, at 5, 5-6 (It.); Robin Osborne¸ Law in Action in Classical Athens, 105
J. HELLENIC STUD. 40 (1985); see also THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO ANCIENT
GREEK LAW (Michael Gagarin & David Cohen, eds., 2005). Was enforcement of
these laws centralized and consistent? See, e.g., Edward M. Harris, Who
Enforced the Law in Classical Athens, in SYMPOSION 2005: VORTRÄGE ZUR
GRIECHISCHEN UND HELLENISTISCHEN RECHTSGESCHICHTE 159 (2007) (Ger.); see
also VIRGINIA HUNTER, POLICING ATHENS: SOCIAL CONTROL IN THE ATTIC
LAWSUITS, 420-320 B.C. 120-53 (1994); Moshe Berent, Anthropology and the
Classics: War, Violence, and the Stateless Polis, 50 CLASSICAL Q. 257, 258-61
(2000). Did legal or extra-legal arguments play a fundamental role in litigation?
See, e.g., Edward M. Harris, The Rule of Law in Athenian Democracy, DIKE,
2006, at 156, 171-175 (It.) [hereinafter Harris, The Rule of Law in Athenian
Democracy]; see also LANNI, supra note 14, at 42-74.
33. See FULLER, supra note 32; H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961). For
a historical overview, see Nardulli et al., supra note 4, at 150-51.
34. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986).
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conceal different approaches to the ancient evidence and
different conceptions of law.35 As a result, the polarization of
the debate—or, as she puts it, the two images on the ‘Rubin
vase’ of the Athenian rule of law—exist because “both
images are actually there.”36
Notwithstanding the discomfort at seeing the debate
become an object of study in its own right, I wholeheartedly
agree with Forsdyke. Moreover, I would add that the
incompatibility between available interpretations also
arises from one fundamental methodological choice, made
by both sides to the matter—a choice according to which the
RoL is conceived as an end in itself rather than as a means
toward an end. Before I move on to formulate the positive
part of my argument—that is, before I lay out what I believe
this ‘end’ to be—I must go back to discuss the first principle
in Gagarin’s tripartite construction.
Despite this vague rendition, speaking of ‘authoritative
rules’ locates the first principle within the boundaries of the
debate over the concept of sovereignty of law that
dominated discussions of Athenian law for almost a
century.37 The debate centered on the role and function of
the procedure of graphe paranomon and, more specifically,
on whether or not the graphe paranomon performed the
function of judicial review of legislation passed in the
Assembly. A positive answer to this question was taken to
35. Forsdyke, supra note 28 (manuscript at 23-24).
36. Id. (manuscript at 1).
37. Forsdyke places the origins of the debate in the second half of the
twentieth century, when the thesis developed by Hansen in the mid-1970s was
picked up and developed by Ostwald and Sealey in the late 1980s. Forsdyke,
supra note 28 (manuscript at 4-5); see RAPHAEL SEALEY, THE ATHENIAN
REPUBLIC: DEMOCRACY OR THE RULE OF LAW? 42-45 (1987). In antedating the
origins of the debate over sovereignty to the late nineteenth century, I
emphasize the continuity between the mature debate over sovereignty that took
place in the 1980s and its logical antecedent: the ‘constitutionalist model’ of
Athenian democracy based on the analogy between the procedure of graphe
paranomon and judicial review first suggested by Thomas Goodell in 1893-1894.
See Thomas Dwight Goodell, An Athenian Parallel to a Function of Our
Supreme Court, 2 YALE REV. 64 (1893). Robert Bonner and Gertrude Smith later
continued Goodell’s analogy. See 2 ROBERT J. BONNER & GERTRUDE SMITH, THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE FROM HOMER TO ARISTOTLE 296-97 (1938).
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mean that ultimate sovereignty within the state was
conferred to the law courts over the Assembly and, by
extension, to the laws themselves over the people.38 The
debate soon settled on two diametrically opposed
interpretations: for some, sovereignty lay unshaken in the
hands of the people, even across the fourth century divide;39
for others, the late fifth century reforms introduced such an
unquestionable primacy of the law over the people that even
the very meaning of democracy in Athens was questioned.40
The impasse recently reached by the debate over the
Athenian RoL has, thus, an illustrious antecedent in the
debate over sovereignty.
Speaking of sovereignty of law in a post-Westphalian
(and post-Bodinian/Hobbesian) world requires us to search
for a unitary locus of sovereignty. However, as Ober already
noted in 1989:
Attempts to define divisions of powers, to find a unitary locus of
sovereignty, and to enunciate a [“RoL”] that was exterior,
superior, and in opposition to the will of the people will not, I
think, help us to understand the nature of Athenian democracy,

38. See HANSEN, SOVEREIGNTY OF THE PEOPLE’S COURT, supra note 31. For an
overview of the opposing arguments, see Forsdyke, supra note 28 (manuscript at
4-7).
39. See Peter J. Rhodes, Enmity in Fourth-Century Athens, in KOSMOS:
ESSAYS IN ORDER, CONFLICT, AND COMMUNITY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS 144, 144-45
(Paul Cartledge et al. eds., 1998); Peter J. Rhodes, Judicial Procedures in
Fourth-Century Athens: Improvement or Simply Change?, in DIE ATHENISCHE
DEMOKRATIE IM 4. JAHRHUNDERT V. CHR. 303 (Walter Eder ed., 1995) (Ger.);
Gerhard Thür, Book Review, 55 GNOMON 601 (1983) (Ger.) (reviewing HANSEN,
SOVEREIGNTY OF THE PEOPLE’S COURT, supra note 31); Gerhard Thür, Die
Athenischen Geschwornengerichte—eine Sackgasse?, in DIE ATHENISCHE
DEMOKRATIE IM 4. JAHRHUNDERT V. CHR., supra, at 321.
40. See HANSEN, SOVEREIGNTY OF THE PEOPLE’S COURT, supra note 31; MARTIN
OSTWALD, FROM POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY TO THE SOVEREIGNTY OF LAW, at xix-xxii
(1986); SEALEY, supra note 37, at 138-140. Harris settled the debate over the
apparent contradiction between sovereignty of law and sovereignty of the people
by arguing that democracy and RoL are far from incompatible. See Harris, The
Rule of Law in Athenian Democracy, supra note 32, at 157-59. Harris’ is an
important argument—one that, however, introduced into the debate a new
challenge—that of defining the features of the Athenian RoL.
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because the Athenians themselves never acted nor thought along
41
those lines.

Equating RoL to the principle of sovereignty of law,
then, burdens the notion of RoL with a heavy load—a load
that is problematic not only to the understanding of ancient
Athens, but also to the very idea of RoL.
The advocates of the sovereignty of law/RoL position
almost unmistakably locate the origins of the Athenian
belief in the supremacy of law in a passage of Euripides’
Suppliants where Theseus, Athens’ mythical founder,
contrasts the rule of a tyrant with the rule of the (written)
laws.42 As Forsdyke shows, however, Theseus’ appeal (and
thus the notion of sovereign law) finds a worthy counterpart
in an idea expressed never so well as in Demosthenes’
superlative closure of the oration against Meidias, where
the orator asks his audience:
And what is the strength of the laws? If one of you is wronged and
cries aloud, will the laws run up and be at his side to assist him?
No; they are only written texts and incapable of such action.
Wherein then resides their power? In yourselves, if only you
support them and make them all-powerful to help him who needs
them. So the laws are strong through you and you through the
43
laws.

41. OBER, MASS AND ELITE, supra note 6, at 22.
42. EURIPIDES, Suppliants, in 1 EURIPIDES, THE COMPLETE GREEK DRAMA lines
426-55 (Whitney J. Oates & Eugene O'Neill, Jr. eds., E.P. Coleridge, trans.,
1938) (Eur. Supp. 426-55), available at http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/
hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0122%3Acard%3D426. The value
of isonomia for good government was celebrated in the fifth century by
Herodotus and, perhaps more caustically, by Thucydides. See 3 HERODOTUS, The
Histories, in HERODOTUS ch. 80, §§5-6 (A.D. Godley trans., 1920) (Hdt. 3.80.5-6),
available at http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A
1999.01.0126%3Abook%3D3%3Achapter%3D80%3Asection%3D5; THUCYDIDES,
The Peloponnesian War, in THUCYDIDES: HISTORIAE IN TWO VOLUMES ch. 37
(Benjamin Jowett trans., 1942) (Thuc. 2.37), available at http://www.
perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0247%3Abook%
3D2%3Achapter%3D37.
43. DEMOSTHENES, Against Midias, in DEMOSTHENES WITH AN ENGLISH
TRANSLATION §224 (A.T. Murray trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1939) (Dem.
21.224), available at http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus
%3Atext%3A1999.01.0074%3Aspeech%3D21%3Asection%3D224; see Forsdyke,

2014] WHAT IS THE RULE OF LAW GOOD FOR?

135

If the laws are inanimate and their strength rests on
human agency, how can ‘the law’ be sovereign?
Demosthenes points here to an inconsistency in the doctrine
of sovereign law that legal philosophy has struggled with for
centuries after him. As Dworkin remarks in the preface of
Law’s Empire:
We live in and by the law. . . . It is sword, shield and menace: we
insist on our wage, or refuse to pay our rent, or are forced to
forfeit penalties, or are closed up in jail, all in the name of what
our abstract and ethereal sovereign, the law, has decreed, even
when the books that are supposed to record its command and
44
directions are silent.

Dworkin’s passage highlights that such inconsistency is not
a feature of the ancient Athenian reflection on law, but part
and parcel of the nature of law. In every legal system, there
exist areas of ‘penumbra’ where the application of the law is
not a function of mere transposition of the letter of the law
to a specific court case. Moreover, the mere existence of a
law is not a guarantee for its correct and consistent
applicability. The idea of sovereign law, therefore, ought to
be analyzed in light of these difficulties: that the realm of
substantive law is man-made and that procedure offers a
partial (sometimes very partial) degree of protection against
abuse or, to put it in a more optimistic perspective, various
degrees of interpretive freedom.45
The idea of sovereign law in Athens has been attacked
by reference to specific features of Athenian law and the
Athenian legal system: the use of law as evidence (as
opposed to the body of “rules by which a case should be

supra note 28 (manuscript at 7-8) (describing the idea that “laws are inert and
need human agents to enforce them”).
44. Dworkin, supra note 34, at vii (emphasis added).
45. In developing this argument I do not take up the thorny issue of legal
change. On the introduction in the Athenian legal system of rules of change and
the relationship of these rules with Athenian legal ideology (that largely saw
law as immutable), see Mirko Canevaro, Making and Changing Laws in
Classical Athens, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ANCIENT GREEK LAW (E.M. Harris
and Mirko Canevaro eds., forthcoming 2015).
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decided”);46 the law’s persuasive (as opposed to binding)
force in a court of law;47 and the statutes’ substantive
vagueness. Yet, elaborating on Dworkin’s argument, I
suggest that there are reasons to question the analytical
validity of the idea of unitary sovereignty on wholly
different grounds. The problem is not that, as Forsdyke put
it, “gaps in the law were a result of the ad hoc development
of Athenian law.”48 The problem, as I see it, has much
deeper roots.
In order to clarify my point, in what follows, I carry out
a comparison between two constitutional debates that
revolved around the question of sovereignty; one took place
in Athens in the last decade of the fifth century BC, and the
other occurred in England during the seventeenth century.
The aim of such a comparison is to show that even in
monarchical England—that is to say, when the idea of
unitary sovereignty had an institutional bearer, namely, the
king, and a highly philosophical elaboration, first and
foremost by Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes—the concept of
unitary sovereignty proved impracticable in the face of a
viable opposition. In light of this comparison, I conclude
that sovereignty constitutes a highly problematic concept,
and one that definitions of RoL ought to move away from.
In the late sixteenth century, Jean Bodin settled the
medieval debate concerning the right of resistance—that is,
the right of a people to resist a badly-performing king—by
conceptualizing the restraints on royal power as
“recommendations of prudence and good government,”
rather than “constitutional requirements.”49 In reaction to,
46. Forsdyke, supra note 28 (manuscript at 7-9); see 2 A.R.W. HARRISON, THE
LAW OF ATHENS 133-35 (1971).
47. TODD, supra note 32, at 58-60.
48. Forsdyke, supra note 28 (manuscript at 12).
49. Julian H. Franklin, Introduction to JEAN BODIN, ON SOVEREIGNTY xiii
(Julian H. Franklin ed., trans., 1992). The issue, both conceptually and
practically, revolved around the difficulty of accommodating divinely ordained
absolute sovereignty in the face of two challenges: the reciprocal relationship of
political and religious authority and the reciprocal relationship between
sovereign and subjects. Id. In the latter context, the problem was to recognize a
space for lawful resistance to a sovereign who misbehaved. Before Bodin, jurists
and political thinkers limited themselves to the recognition of a series of
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and inspired by Bodin’s formulation of indivisible and
absolute royal sovereignty, in the mid-seventeenth century,
a theory of parliamentary sovereignty developed in
England. Michael Mendle has convincingly argued that
“Parliamentary sovereignty” was as absolute as royal
sovereignty because it was “claimed in the way that
Charles’ lawyers and lay theoreticians had made a case for
Charles’ absolute power.”50 Moreover, the theory of
parliamentary sovereignty, as that of royal sovereignty in
response to which it was developed, presented the same
uneasy relationship between the contradictory demands of
absolute sovereignty on the one hand and deference to law
and the ancient constitution on the other. This point is
crystallized by Pocock:
A quarter of a century later . . . we have the parliament of 1628
asserting the aboriginality and primacy of custom and statute in
order to check the claims of the crown’s lawyers that England was
governed by several discrete laws and the king had discretion in
51
choosing by which to proceed.

In addition to exemplifying the attempt of both Crown and
Parliament to situate themselves in relation to each other
and to the law, this quote from Pocock also highlights that,
behind the veil of the opposing demands for absolute
sovereignty, the relationship between king and parliament,
even at a theoretical level, was actually quite complicated.52
exceptions to the obedience of a sovereign that was otherwise absolute. Id. at
xviii. As a consequence of this practice, both the principle of absolute
sovereignty and the legal status of the right of resistance were dangerously
undermined. See id.
50. Michael Mendle, Parliamentary Sovereignty: A Very English Absolutism,
in POLITICAL DISCOURSE IN EARLY MODERN BRITAIN 97, 98 (Nicholas Phillipson &
Quentin Skinner eds., 1993).
51. J.G.A. Pocock, A Discourse of Sovereignty: Observations on the Work in
Progress, in POLITICAL DISCOURSE IN EARLY MODERN BRITAIN, supra note 50, at
377, 385.
52. There were other sides to the debate too. See CORINNE COMSTOCK WESTON
& JANELLE RENFROW GREENBERG, SUBJECTS AND SOVEREIGNS: THE GRAND
CONTROVERSY OVER LEGAL SOVEREIGNTY IN STUART ENGLAND 1 (1981) (providing
an overview of what they term the “political theory of order” and the
“community-centered view of government”). The idea of sovereignty of the law
was formulated in two slightly different arguments, one philosophical and the
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Moreover, according to Maitland, already in the
sixteenth and early seventeenth century:
The long parliaments of Henry VIII, Elizabeth and James, no
doubt had very important results—not only did they educate the
commons to act together, but they familiarized the nation with the
notion of parliament as of a permanent entity, in which the
53
sovereignty of the realm might be vested . . . .

Among the key privileges that members of the Parliament
enjoyed, Maitland illustrates, were freedom of speech,
freedom from arrest—which in Maitland’s opinion boils
down to actually constituting immunity from ordinary
law54—and (especially before James) even regulation of
succession to the throne.55 The principle of royal absolutism
was therefore limited by fundamental practical exceptions.
At the same time, it was hard indeed to make a case for the
supremacy of the parliament since the parliament’s very
existence depended on the king’s will.56 Absolute theories of
royal sovereignty or parliamentary sovereignty were thus
not only theoretically lacking, but they were also
impracticable because the debate had, since its inception,
collided with the rough terrain of political practice.
As the debate degenerated into civil war and climaxed
in the decapitation of Charles I, the stakes of the political
debate suddenly got higher. As Pocock insightfully
suggested, “it is the experience of an anomic condition
which constituted the central trauma of English history.”57
Barrington Moore bolsters this position, noting that “[n]o
other juridical, by Samuel Rutherford and Edward Coke, respectively. See
SAMUEL RUTHERFORD, LEX, REX: THE LAW AND THE PRINCE (1644). For an
overview of Coke’s position, see F.W. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
OF ENGLAND 300-01 (1908).
53. MAITLAND, supra note 52, at 250.
54. Id. at 243.
55. Id. at 253. Henry VIII (1509-1547) appealed to the parliament to regulate
the succession to the throne, and during Elizabeth’s reign (1558-1603) it was
treason to admit that the succession could not be settled by an act of parliament.
Id. at 252.
56. Id. at 252-54.
57. Pocock, supra note 51, at 393.
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subsequent English king tried to take royal absolutism
seriously again.”58
The Athenian constitutional debate revolved around a
similar, though less theoretically elaborate, tension between
absolute demands to sovereignty and practical checks on
these demands. In both cases, the check was framed in
terms of the existence of a body of laws—an ancestral
constitution—that demanded recognition.59 Respect for the
laws of the fathers, subsumed under the rubric of the
appeals to the concept of patrios politeia (i.e., the
constitution of the fathers) punctuated the claims of both
democrats and oligarchs to power.60 After a century of
democracy, however, and given the Greek peculiar obsession
with tyranny, no oligarch (or democrat, for that matters)
would dream of framing his claims in terms of absolute and
uncontested power—that is in terms of absolute
sovereignty.
Yet, the fifth century democracy had collapsed under
the weight of the military consequences of unrestrained
decision-making power.61 Analogously, the oligarch’s
58. BARRINGTON MOORE JR., SOCIAL ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY
17 (1966).
59. In the case of England, see Pocock, supra note 51.
60. ARISTOTLE, Athenian Constitution, in ARISTOTLE IN 23 VOLUMES § 29.3 (H
Rackham trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1952), available at http://www.perseus.
tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0046%3Achapter%3D29
%3Asection%3D3; ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 29.3); THUCYDIDES, The Peloponnesian War,
in THUCYDIDES: HISTORIAE IN TWO VOLUMES § 8.76.6 (Richard Crawley trans., J.
M Dent 1910) (Thuc. 8.76.6), available at http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/
hopper/text?doc=Thuc.+8.76.6&fromdoc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0247.
61. According to Thucydides, after the failure of the attempt to conquer
Sicily—a failure that took a tremendous toll on Athenian resources—the polis
reacted unanimously to the question concerning who (or what) was to be held
responsible for the failure: “they [the Athenians] were angry with the orators,
who had joined in promoting the expedition, just as if they had not themselves
voted it.” THUCYDIDES, supra note 60, § 8.1.1 (Thuc. 8.1.1); see also LYSIAS, On
the Confiscation of the Property of the Brother of Nicias, in LYSIAS (1930) (Lys.
18.2) (“[T]he responsibility for the disaster ought in fairness to lie with those
who persuaded you.”), available at http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/
text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0154%3Aspeech%3D18%3Asection%3D2.
The passages emphasize the lack of constraints on the power of the orators to
persuade the demos and the tendency of the demos to shift the blame on others
instead of taking responsibility for its own decisions. See also JOSIAH OBER,
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repeated refusal to abide by the rules set by (quasi-)
legitimate constitutional assemblies triggered the explosion
of civil violence.62 As in England, so in Athens, the
experience of violence was the single most important
argument against unitary sovereignty and a factor that
shaped the following steps in important ways.
Interestingly, in both cases the violence was put to an
end and the constitutional impasse overcome when the
parties to the fight agreed on one fundamental principle:
that of coordination in lawmaking. Barry Weingast has
successfully argued that, in the case of England, the Bill of
Rights and the Settlement constituted a coordination device
that clarified “an explicit set of strategies over what actions
should trigger a joint response by both groups [i.e., Whigs
and Tories].”63 Analogously, I suggest that, in Athens, a
consensus framed in terms of patrios politeia introduced the
principle of coordination in lawmaking by means of
legislative reforms. Such reforms established boards of
nomothetai (lit. lawgivers) that shared with the Assembly
the power to make laws.64
Obviously, the cases of seventeenth century England
and fifth century B.C. Athens differ profoundly, and it is not
my purpose to deny or mystify such a truism. The purpose
POLITICAL DISSENT IN DEMOCRATIC ATHENS: INTELLECTUAL CRISIS
RULE 52-121 (1998).

OF

POPULAR

62. XENOPHON, supra note 16, §§ 2.3-2.4 (Xen. Hell. 2.3-2.4). The oligarchy of
the Four Hundred was constitutionally established in 411 through popular vote
(albeit the legitimacy of the assembly that voted the democracy out of existence
was highly questionable). The vote ratified that the Four Hundred were
commissioned to form a transitional government before yielding power to a
broader oligarchy of five thousand citizens. In spite of this, the Four Hundred
kept postponing the election of the Five Thousand. See THUCYDIDES, supra note
60, §§ 8.89-90 (Thuc. 8.89-90); Aristotle, supra note 60, § 32 ([Arist.] Ath. Pol.
32). In a similar vein, in 403 although “the Thirty had been chosen . . . for the
purpose of framing a constitution under which to conduct the government, they
continually delayed framing and publishing this constitution, but they
appointed a Senate [i.e., boule] and the other magistrates as they saw fit.”
XENOPHON, supra, §§ 2.3.11-12 (Xen. Hell. 2.3.11-12); see also Aristotle, supra
note 60, § 35 ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 35).
63. Barry R. Weingast, The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule
of Law, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 245, 253 (1997).
64. HANSEN, THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 32, at 161-77.

2014] WHAT IS THE RULE OF LAW GOOD FOR?

141

of my comparison is twofold: first, to emphasize the limits of
theoretical and, most of all, rhetorical elaborations of
sovereignty of law as we find them in our sources; second, to
corroborate my argument concerning the problematic
nature of the concept of unitary sovereignty with a
reconstruction of the fate of the ideal in a political landscape
that, unlike that of classical Athens, could have much more
easily accommodated the concept.
As to the idea of sovereignty of law, its problematic
nature emerged for the British theoreticians (even before it
presented itself to the practitioners) in the difficulty of
answering the question: who makes the law?
In Lex Rex, Samuel Rutherford employed arguments
from Scripture, Natural Law, and Scottish law to attack
royal absolutism and emphasize the importance of the
original covenant and the law (by which Rutherford
included Divine Law and Natural Law as well as positive
law). He maintained that, “the power of creating a man a
king is from the people” and that “[t]he law hath a
supremacy of constitution above the king.”65 Thus, by the
transitive property, the people have the power to make a
man king and the king is subject to law.66 Establishing the
primacy of law, then, is to avoid the problem of the source of
authority from which the law necessarily derives.
Moreover, framed in terms of sovereign power, the law
is locked up behind a wall of adamant immutability that
may well serve functional purposes, especially in the face of
political instability, but that also allows the justification of
the status quo—whatever that may be.
The problem of sovereignty, then, is that it imposes a
synchronic veil of order over an intrinsically mutable matter
—the law.
The point of my comparison is that equating RoL to the
sovereignty of law in the context of ancient Athens is not
only unwarranted (as Ober remarked, the Athenians never
65. RUTHERFORD, supra note 52, at 10, 230 (Conclusion to Question IV and
Assertion 1, Question XXVI).
66. The sovereignty of law is therefore rooted in popular consensus over royal
investiture.
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‘thought along those lines’)67 but also misleading. When it
comes to modern developed countries, equating RoL to
sovereignty is a truism insofar as the principle of judicial
independence functions as a (de jure and de facto) guarantor
of such equation. We tend not to debate anymore (as Sealey,
for example, did)68 the compatibility between RoL and
democracy, and despite the fact that western constitutions
locate the source of legitimate authority in the people, we
rarely question the existence of the RoL in our developed
democracies. Conversely, in places where judicial
independence is merely de jure (many developing countries)
or does not apply (ancient Athens),69 speaking of RoL in
terms of unitary sovereignty is a fruitless, if not dangerous,
exercise.
I suggest, therefore, that we must reject the equation
between sovereignty of law and RoL and question the
uncritical agreement on the RoL qua legal supremacy when
legal supremacy is framed in terms of sovereignty.
III. CODIFICATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF LAW IN A
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
As I showed at the beginning of Part II, Gowder’s claim
that Athens satisfied the principle of regularity finds ample
support in modern scholarship. However, as Gowder himself
notes, “One worry leading to a potential objection with
respect to regularity in Athens arises from the extent of the
discretion juries had to convict defendants.”70
Despite recent challenges, Lanni’s argument that juries
in Athens’ popular courts exercised vast discretion in
convicting or acquitting defendants71 remains a tough nut to
crack. Lanni’s detractors have emphasized, in particular,
the role of the judicial oath as a check on juries’ discretion. 72
67. OBER, MASS AND ELITE, supra note 6, at 22.
68. See SEALEY, supra note 37.
69. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
70. Gowder, supra note 12, at 15.
71. LANNI, supra note 14.
72. Harris, The Rule of Law in Athenian Democracy, supra note 32, at 158-70.
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Gowder concisely summarizes the conflicting positions as
follows: “While the jurors were required to take an oath to
follow the law, some scholars have argued that extra-legal
evidence was often taken into consideration such that jurors
often did not act as if they were bound to convict or acquit
defendants on legal grounds alone.”73
The crux of the matter here, is the meaning of ‘legal
grounds.’ In equating legal grounds with written law,
Gowder is directly addressing the widespread tendency to
consider codification as a prerequisite for RoL claims. In
line with this assumption, classical scholars have regarded
the process of revision and codification of the laws that took
place in Athens in the last decade of the fifth century as a
huge step forward in terms of Athens’ achievement of the
RoL.74 Moreover, the reform passed in the years around 403
and quoted by Andocides—a reform that forbade
magistrates from enforcing unwritten rules in the popular
courts—has tended to confirm the preeminence of written
legislation over informal norms in the courts of classical
Athens, at least in the fourth century.75
However, as Gowder observes, the RoL does not require
all the laws be written or codified. In order to illustrate his
point, Gowder cites the example of common law countries,
such as the United States and Britain, “which incorporate
social custom into the law and still comply with the rule of
law.”76 Gowder’s clarification is valuable in that it confirms
the role played by idiosyncratic definitions of RoL in
shaping the debate over the RoL in Athens.

73. Gowder, supra note 12, at 15 & n.57.
74. However, doubts remain concerning how available the laws (and records
form court proceedings) actually were, even in the fourth century. See JAMES P.
SICKINGER, PUBLIC RECORDS AND ARCHIVES IN CLASSICAL ATHENS (1999); Harris,
POLITICS, supra note 28; Adriaan Lanni, Arguing from ‘Precedent’: Modern
Perspectives on Athenian Practice, in THE LAW AND THE COURTS IN ANCIENT
GREECE, supra note 28, at 159; James P. Sickinger, The Laws of Athens:
Publication, Preservation, Consultation, in THE LAW AND THE COURTS IN ANCIENT
GREECE, supra note 28, at 93.
75. See infra text accompanying notes 88-91.
76. Gowder, supra note 12, at 17.
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However, Gowder’s argument can be taken a bit
further: if codification is not a necessary prerequisite for the
existence of a rule of precedent, the problem of codification
may not merely concern the nature of law, as much as it
concerns its enforcement.77 In other words, in terms of
Gowder’s publicity principle, there is a worry that
unwritten law would be hard to enforce because ordinary
Athenians may disagree on what exactly, and at any given
time, constitutes applicable principles of unwritten law.
Yet, as Gowder argues,
Athens’ small population, its cultural and religious homogeneity,
the public nature of its procedures, and the extent of citizen
participation in juries all give us good reason to suppose that
ordinary citizens were familiar, in their capacities as citizens,
78
with the law that they enforced in their capacities as jurors.

Gowder’s arguments suggest that the enforcement of
formal law alongside informal norms in the courts of
Classical Athens does not necessarily imply that Athens
rejected the RoL, as Lanni maintains. Lanni, however,
would in turn answer Gowder’s objection by remarking that
the problem is not so much the existence and the
enforcement in Athenian courts of both written and
unwritten rules;79 the problem, as she sees it, is the
multiplicity of norms at play that, by making outcomes
unpredictable and ad hoc, defies RoL standards of
predictability and consistency. Conversely, Gowder’s thesis
would probably find support in Harris’ claim that
predictability and consistency were in fact achieved in
Athens, although Harris would probably deny that extra-

77. This is particularly true where enforcement is carried out by a wealth of
different actors. On the relative role of magistrates and citizens in enforcing the
law, see HUNTER, supra note 32 and Harris, POLITICS, supra note 28.
78. Gowder, supra note 12, at 19.
79. In her 2009 essay, Lanni actually claims that the fact that Athenian
courts enforced unwritten norms alongside formal statutes contributed to render
Athens a “remarkably peaceful and well-ordered society.” Adriaan Lanni, Social
Norms in the Courts of Ancient Athens, 1 J. OF LEGAL ANALYSIS 691, 693 (2009).
In fact, enforcement of informal norms compensated the weakness in the
Athenian system of law enforcement.
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legal arguments played any significant role in court
verdicts.80
In what follows, I suggest an alternative pathway to
examine the interplay between written and unwritten law
in Athens (and its implications for the idea of RoL). Lanni’s
2009 essay, which Gowder amply references, opens with a
discussion of the growing academic literature that looks at
“the relationship between social norms and informal
sanctions (such as gossip or private dispute resolution) on
the one hand, and formal legal rules and institutions on the
other . . . .”81 Lanni rightly observes that, “[t]he Athenian
case is particularly interesting . . . . While much of the
norms literature focuses on the choice between informal and
formal norms and institutions, in Athens informal norms
were enforced through the formal court system.”82 I contend
that as long as we consider modern developed countries as
comparanda, the intricacies of unwritten law and
decentralized enforcement as well as their relationship with
formal structures may ultimately escape us. Elaborating on
Lanni’s insight, I suggest that, in order to fully appreciate
the singularity of the Athenian case, developing countries
with dual legal systems may offer a more fruitful
comparison.
My recent work experience in legal empowerment
NGOs in Africa informs this perspective. In Sierra Leone,
for example, decentralized mechanisms of dispute resolution
have in part been subsumed under the rubric of formal
institutions. As Varvaloucas et al. explain:
The foundation of Sierra Leone’s current dual legal system was
laid in 1896, when the colonial British government signed the
Protectorate Declaration with local chiefs in what is now known
as the Provinces. . . . Legal dualism had existed informally before
1896, but the Proclamation formalized the structure, leading to
the official division of the justice system into two parts: a formal
80. See Edward M. Harris, Law and Oratory, in PERSUASION: GREEK
RHETORIC IN ACTION 130-50 (Ian Worthington ed., 1994); Edward M. Harris,
Open Texture in Athenian Law, DIKE, 2000, at 27, 27-29 (It.); Harris, POLITICS,
supra note 28.
81. Lanni, supra note 79, at 691.
82. Id. at 692.
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system instituting mostly British common law and statutes, and a
customary system based on traditional law and courts run by
paramount chiefs. . . . After independence, the new government of
Sierra Leone continued using British common law and statutory
law, as the colonial government had. In 1963, two years after
independence, the Local Courts Act of 1963 was passed, governing
customary law in the Provinces. The LCA repealed the paramount
chiefs’ courts, now mandating that a paramount chief nominate a
local court chairman to oversee the local courts. While the
authority of village and section chiefs were not recognized by the
government as legally binding, chiefs continued to adjudicate
cases in their communities, as they had before colonialism and as
they continue to do today. Similar systems exist in other African
countries formerly ruled by the British, such as Ghana, Uganda,
83
Kenya, and Zimbabwe.

Sierra Leone’s 1991 constitution statutorily recognizes
customary—that is, unwritten—law as a source of
legitimate authority. Section 170 of the Constitution of
Sierra Leone84 introduces a principle that is most explicitly
stated in the Local Court Act 2011, section 1:85 the principle
according to which formal law trumps customary law in
formal institutions. Customary law then applies in the
context of formal institutions only insofar as the
constitution, the common law and statutes are silent;
customary law also applies in the context of informal
institutions as long as it does not contradict the principles of
83. Alaina Varvaloucas et al., Improving the Justice Sector: Law and
Institution-Building in Sierra Leone, in ECONOMIC CHALLENGES AND POLICY
ISSUES IN EARLY TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY SIERRA LEONE 511-12 (Omotunde E.G.
Johnson ed., 2012).
84. CONSTITUTION OF SIERRA LEONE 1991, ch. 12, § 170.
85. While copies of the Local Court Act are not widely available, a lawyer and
founding director of a law NGO in Sierra Leone has verified the Act's contents.
Interviews with Simeon Koroma, Founding Director, Timap for Justice, in
Freetown, Sierra Leone (July 2013). For a general discussion of the Local Court
Act, see Allieu Vandi Koroma, Transforming the Informal Justice Sector:
Discussing Relevant Provisions of the Newly Enacted Local Courts Act 2011,
CENTRE FOR ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE RULE OF LAW (Oct. 3 2011),
http://www.carl-sl.org/home/reports/516-transforming-the-informal-justicesector-discussing-relevant-provisions-of-the-newly-enacted-local-courts-act2011-; Evaluation of the Recently Enacted Local Court Act 2011, UNITED
NATIONS INTEGRATED PEACEBUILDING OFFICE IN SIERRA LEONE, http:/
/unipsil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?ctl=Details&tabid=9649&mid=12590&Ite
mID=10756 (last visited Dec. 8, 2013).
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natural justice, equity, and good conscience or conflict with
any statute.86
Despite the presence of formal institutions and a
hierarchy of norms, in Sierra Leone, geographic isolation
and the lack of centralized states (not to mention delays,
case overload and widespread corruption in the formal
system) often allow for de facto autonomy. In such
interstices, traditional authorities and unwritten law
govern collective behavior—and they are often the only
available source of legality. Cases like Sierra Leone reveal
that the foremost difference between written and unwritten
law is not one of nature but one of enforcement. Unwritten
law is ‘arbitrary’ only insofar as the authorities that
administer it tend to be corrupt (a risk to which formal law
is not wholly insusceptible), and saying that ordinary
citizens are unaware of the principles governing their
relations with their neighbors is, more often than not,
patently false. Unlike formal law, unwritten law in Sierra
Leone is an everyday reality. As a result, any average
Sierra Leonean would understand the judgment of a
Paramount Chief much more readily and accurately than an
average Italian is able to understand the verdict of the
Corte di Cassazione.87
More complicated is the relationship between formal
and informal justice institutions and that between written
and unwritten law. Yet, it may be argued that the preeminence of written law over unwritten law in formal
Athenian courts, introduced at the end of the fifth century
and enshrined in the reform quoted by Andocides,88
resembles the hierarchy of norms enshrined in postindependence African constitutions. The Athenian provision
86. I would like to thank Simeon Koroma for his help in clarifying the
intricacies of the relationship between different bodies of laws in Sierra Leone.
87. Seeing is believing: Berlusconi Fans Misunderstanding the Sentence that
Convicted Silvio for Good on Charges of Tax Fraud, YOUTUBE (Aug. 2, 2013),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VCy1sfxtHw0.
88. Andocides, On the Mysteries, in 1 MINOR ATTIC ORATORS IN TWO VOLUMES
§ 87 (K.J. Maidment trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1968) (Andoc. 1.87), available
at
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A
1999.01.0018%3Aspeech%3D1%3Asection%3D87.
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is stricter insofar as it seems to entirely ban unwritten law
from formal institutions (i.e., the popular courts) but it says
nothing about other applications of unwritten law beyond
these structures. It is in fact worth emphasizing that, as far
as we know, the reform applied to the centralized judicial
bodies of the polis (as indicated by the use of τὰς ἀρχὰς, i.e.,
the magistrates),89 and we know very little about, and focus
even less on, the existence of decentralized mechanisms of
dispute resolution, for example at the deme level90 or in the
context of what Forsdyke has termed ‘extra-judicial popular
justice.’91 I suggest that the wealth of law-court evidence
from the fourth century, by directing our attention away
from decentralized mechanisms of dispute resolution, may
have contributed to a partial understanding of the meaning
of these reforms.
The debate over the RoL in Athens has graduated from
one that revolved around ill-defined, abstract principles to
one that seeks universal answers from partial evidence and
relies on large numbers (of quotes) as the only
methodologically viable approach to determine whether (or
not) the RoL existed in Athens. I welcome the shift, but the
impasse reached by current debates compels us to move
forward and evaluate methodologies as well as questions
based on their achievements. At the same time, interesting
developments such as Gowder’s are still locked in a logic

89. Id.
90. We hear of judges operating at the deme level from Demosthenes and
Pseudo-Aristotle. See DEMOSTHENES, Against Timocrates, in DEMOSTHENES WITH
AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION, supra note 43, at 112.2 (Dem. 24.112.2); Aristotle,
supra note 60, § 53.1 ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 53.1); see also LYSIAS, Against Pancleon,
in LYSIAS, supra note 61, § 23.2 (Lys. 23.2), who however terms them tribe
judges; cf. P.J. RHODES, A COMMENTARY ON THE ARISTOTELIAN ATHENAION
POLITEIA 588 (1st ed. 1981); DOUGLAS MACDOWELL, THE LAW IN CLASSICAL
ATHENS 206-07 (H.H. Scullard ed., 1978).
91. Forsdyke, supra note 28 (manuscript at 18-22). The relationship between
formal courts and alternative mechanisms of dispute resolution, such as
mediation and domestic arbitration, also deserves more attention. For an
overview, see, for example, HARRISON, supra note 46, at 64-68; MACDOWELL,
supra note 90, at 203-11.
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that looks at law as a byproduct of politics—a criticism
Harris has relentlessly put forth in recent years.92
Conversely, I will argue in my dissertation that in the
absence of a unitary locus of sovereignty, the Athenians
developed a non-reified concept of ‘law without sovereignty.’
In other words, law in Athens was neither conceptualized as
a sovereign power, as some RoL theorists would have it, nor
was it understood as the command of a sovereign power, as
Austin postulated. Instead, law in Athens was
conceptualized as a coordination device for collective action:
there were gains to be reaped from the practices of public,
large-scale design, exercise, and enforcement of law. An
analysis of the structure of the legal system in the fourth
century reveals that the Athenians were aware of this fact.
Moreover, I argue that in order to understand what the
rule of law was good for in Athens we ought to focus on the
late fifth century struggles for democracy against civil war
and for prosperity in a post-imperial dimension. The RoL
allowed for prosperity by granting important institutional
access to economically vital non-citizens, while reserving
participation-rights (and thus legislative authority) to
citizens.
The question ‘what is the RoL good for?’ requires a shift
in the analytical perspective with which we approach the
study of law and legal institutions in ancient Athens. Such a
shift owes much to debates over the role and function of law
in the literature on ‘institutions’ and ‘governance.’ Here, the
impact of strong legal institutions on political stability and
economic growth has been, in recent times, widely
explored.93
92. E.g., Edward M. Harris, Law and Oratory, in PERSUASION: GREEK
RHETORIC IN ACTION 130-50 (Ian Worthington ed., 2000); Edward M. Harris,
Open Texture in Athenian Law, DIKE, 2000, at 27, 27-29 (It.); Harris, POLITICS,
supra note 28.
93. See, e.g., DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990); DOUGLASS C. NORTH, STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN
ECONOMIC HISTORY (1981); Daron Acemoglu et al., The Colonial Origins of
Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1369
(2001); Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson, Unbundling Institutions, 113 J. POL.
ECON. 949 (2005); Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON.
1113 (1998); Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52
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It is by reference to these fields that, I suggest, we
should frame our questions concerning the RoL in Athens,
at least insofar as we recognize (and are interested in) the
potential contribution of the Athenian RoL to modern
debates. In the remainder of this paper, I lay out the
framework for an analysis of Athenian legal institutions
and their impact on democratic stability and economic
development in the fourth century—an analysis that will
receive more ample study in my dissertation.
IV. RULE OF LAW, POLITICAL STABILITY AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT IN FOURTH CENTURY ATHENS
In what follows, I move from the assumption that
Athens was indeed different in the fourth than in the fifth
century, not only from the standpoint of its legal
institutions but also from a political and economic
perspective: the loss of the Athenian empire in the
aftermath of the Peloponnesian War meant the loss of the
single most important source of revenues; at the same time,
the fragility of the democracy surfaced in two almost
consecutive and increasingly violent oligarchic regimes and
led to important reforms that modified the democratic
structure of the polis.94 Yet, if we follow Ober, in the
aftermath of these changes—that is, in the fourth century—
Athens was still an incredibly prosperous and stable
democracy.95 How did the polis manage to rebound so
definitively?

J. FIN. 1131 (1997); Rafael La Porta et al. The Economic Consequences of Legal
Origins, 46 J. Econ.Lit. 285, 285 (2008); Rafael La Porta et al., The Quality of
Government, 15 J.L. ECON., & ORG. 222, 222 (1998); Dani Rodrik et al.,
Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions Over Geography and Integration
in Economic Development, 9 J. ECON. GROWTH 131 (2008); Daniel Kaufmann &
Aart Kraay, Growth Without Governance, (World Bank Inst. & Dev. Research
Grp., Pol’y Research Working Paper No. 2928, 2002), available at http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/
2002/12/21/000094946_0212060414208/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf.
94. For a recent and comprehensive treatment of these changes, see Ober &
Weingast, supra note 16.
95. JOSIAH OBER, DEMOCRACY AND KNOWLEDGE 265-68 (2008).
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In my dissertation, I will present an account of how
Athens overcame the threat of violence and the problem of
limited resources in a way that allowed the polis to
successfully develop, both politically and economically. My
hypothesis suggests that a consensus on law created the
conditions without which political stability and economic
growth would have been highly unlikely. In particular, I
suggest that such consensus created two conditions for
sustained stability and growth.
First, the consensus prevented Athens from devolving
into protracted stasis after the unrest of the years 404/3. I
consider political stability as neither a necessary nor a
sufficient condition for growth. Yet, as a minimum
requirement, I contend that the likelihood of achieving high
and sustained economic growth in the context of high and
sustained large-scale social conflict is small. Such an
assumption may sound almost commonsensical. Yet, both in
the ancient and in the modern world, the study of the
impact of violence on processes of development has
produced mixed results.96
Second, by making democracy a viable option, the
consensus laid the foundation for Athenian recovery and
growth because it allowed Athens to exploit its limited
resources more efficiently. I contend that, among the real
regime options available to the polis, the challenge for postimperial Athens to achieve high and sustained levels of
economic growth would have been magnified had a
government other than the democracy been established. I
identify the harbor of Piraeus as the single most important
source of potential revenues in the aftermath of the late
fifth century wars, and I assess the crucial role of the

96. I investigate the validity of my assumption by means of a comparison
between the experiences of civil war in Syracuse in the fifth and fourth
centuries and in Rome in the late second and first centuries. The question
guiding the investigation can be stated as follows: is civil war per se bad for
economic development? For a description of the civil war in Syracuse, see, for
example, SHLOMO BERGER, REVOLUTION AND SOCIETY IN GREEK SICILY AND
SOUTHERN ITALY 34-52 (1992). For Rome, see, for example, P.A. BRUNT, SOCIAL
CONFLICTS IN THE ROMAN REPUBLIC (1971).
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harbor in the recovery of Athens.97 In the context of limited
resources, tapping into Piraeus’ crippled potential required
major investments in infrastructure and institutional
capacity.98 These investments contributed to lower the
threat of violence by raising the cost of fighting; at the same
time, their successful implementation required a set of new
political and economic bargains among citizens and between
citizens and a host of other actors.
The story of Athens in the fourth century is a story that
revolves around Piraeus and the ‘people of Piraeus’—slaves,
metics, and foreign merchants—much more fundamentally
than it is usually acknowledged. In the aftermath of the
civil war, the failure of the repeated attempts of the
democratic leader Thrasybulus to extend citizenship to
those slaves, metics and foreigners that had fought against
the supporters of the bloody oligarchy of the ‘Thirty Tyrants’
reveals that Athenian citizenship was not up for grabs. 99
Yet, Athens needed slaves, metics, and merchants—the
manpower of Piraeus—as much as it needed the harbor
itself. Preventing the productive sectors of the society from
sharing in the public good of citizenship, especially after
97. In order to explore the validity of my assumption, I formulate the
following counterfactual: had Athens been razed to the ground at the end of the
Peloponnesian War, what was the fate of Piraeus likely to have been?
98. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. In addition to rebuilding the
infrastructure of the harbor, the polis also needed to figure out a way to attract
merchants and traders by means other than coercion.
99. Aristotle, supra note 60, § 40.2 ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 40.2); AESCHINES,
Against Ctesiphon, in AESCHINES (Charles Darwin Adams trans., 1919)
(Aeschin. 3.195), available at http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=
Perseus:text:1999.01.0002:speech=3:section=195&highlight=thrasybulus;
PLUTARCH, Dinarchus, in VITAE DECEM ORATORUM § 10 (William W. Goodwin
trans., 1874) (Plutarch, X Orat. Vit. 835 F-36 A), available at
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2008.
01.0346%3Achapter%3D10; P.Oxy.XV 1800: Miscellaneous Biographies,
OXYRHYNCHUS PAPYRI COLLECTION, http://163.1.169.40/cgi-bin/library?e=q-00000---0POxy--00-0-0--0prompt-10---4------0-1l--1-en-50---20-about-1800--00031001-0-0utfZz-8-00&a=d&c=POxy&cl=search&d=HASH9e99183be4ab4dd6840a
04 (last visited Dec. 23, 2013) (P.Oxy 1800 Fragments 6 and 7); Searchable
Greek Inscriptions, IG II2 10, PACKARD HUMAN. INST., http://epigraphy.
packhum.org/inscriptions/main (last visited Dec. 23, 2013) (follow Attica (IG IIII) hyperlink; then follow IG II² hyperlink; then follow 1-278 hyperlink; then
follow 1-20 hyperlink; then follow 10 hyperlink).
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their contribution to the reestablishment of the democracy,
would appear to be a missed opportunity. So much so if we
compare Athens with later societies, particularly the Italian
city-states of early modern times: here, the establishment of
paths to citizenship for merchants has been rightly
regarded as the institutional hallmark of the ability of
places such as Venice and Genoa to harness the economic
forces unleashed by the productive sectors of society and
grow ‘larger than life.’100
The Athenian attitude toward citizenship has
contributed to produce an image of Athens as a closed
society—ultimately, a ‘child of its time.’ Yet, I suggest that
the Athenians’ efforts to protect citizenship in the early
fourth century are best understood as attempts to protect
the fragile political equilibrium that the new democracy
managed to devise in the aftermath of a tremendous and
protracted shock to the system.
At the same time, if citizenship was a public good that
the Athenians were unwilling to share with others, other
public goods were made available. The fifth century
‘economy of coercion’ was superseded by a fourth century
‘open access economy’ that made Piraeus an attractive,
commercial haven in the Aegean. The reconstruction of
Piraeus’ walls and dockyards and the land grants to traders’
religious sanctuaries are only some of the measures aimed
at returning Piraeus to its position of primacy: this goal was
largely achieved by means of reforms that lowered
transaction costs and opened up spaces for merchants to
obtain legal redress as disputes arose.101 Among the
measures implemented, Nicophon’s law—a law whereby
money-testers were set up in the markets of Athens and
Piraeus to secure the silver-content of coins and avoid

100. Robert Salbatino Lopez, Market Expansion: The Case of Genoa, 24 J.
ECON. HIST. 445, 447 (1964); see also SHEILAGH OGILVIE, INSTITUTIONS AND
EUROPEAN TRADE 51-52 (2011). Ogilvie well illustrates the tensions around the
extension of forms of citizenship to merchants although he concludes that “[t]his
comparative openness of Venice and Genoa may have been one source of their
striking commercial dynamism.” Id. at 52.
101. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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counterfeits102—and the establishment of the dikai
emporikai—law courts for the resolution of commercial
disputes103—stand out.
I suggest that rather than analyzing the Athenian
attitude toward citizenship and that toward productive noncitizen actors as unrelated or even contradictory, we should
see them as two sides of the same coin. By throwing the
doors of its law courts and markets open to productive
sectors of the economy—metics, slaves (particularly choris
oikountes, slave bankers, and some categories of public
slaves), and foreign merchants—Athens devised an
alternative to citizenship. Such alternative allowed the polis
to exploit its resources efficiently by reaping the benefits of
the economic activity of non-citizens, while at the same time
protecting a level of internal stability among citizens that
was likewise fundamental for growth.
This access to dispute resolution mechanism, I suggest,
is the key to understand what the Athenian RoL was good
for. Access to the law courts was neither universal nor was
meant to be so as modern notions of access to justice would
require. Athenian openness was less a matter of normative
values than one of profit-maximization. The poor, like the
economically unproductive, are absent from our sources—
unlike, for example, some social strata that we would never
expect to show up (and in fact fail to justify)—such as some
categories of slaves.104
The shift from the fifth to the fourth century, then, was
a shift from economically productive coercion to an open
access economy that revolved around the extension of legal
rights and protection for those that sustained the political

102. See Ronald S. Stroud, An Athenian Law on Silver Coinage, 43 HESPERIA:
THE JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN SCHOOL OF CLASSICAL STUDIES AT ATHENS 157,
159 (1974).
103. See LANNI, supra note 14, at 149.
104. In my dissertation, I will have a detailed discussion of the highly
fragmentary (and likewise debated) evidence related to the legal standing of
choris oikountes, slave bankers, and some categories of public slaves.
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structure of Athens by bringing much needed revenues to
the polis.105
The way the political, economic, and legal infrastructure
of Athens bounced back, refashioned, from the experience of
violence and a protracted shock to the system constitutes an
example of successful democratic consolidation that is worth
explaining. However, the fact that the choice of democracy
was, at least in part, a legacy of path dependence warns us
against the use of easy recipes for implementing democracy
where democracy has never appeared. At the same time, the
role of law and legal institutions at the very root of changes
in economic structures may provide indications as to what
needs to, and can be, done.
CONCLUSION
If we follow Gowder’s argument, we may conclude that
Athens took many steps along the RoL continuum but not
enough of them: in fact, Athens achieved regularity and
publicity but not generality all the way down. As students of
the Athenian democracy, we tend to conceive of inclusion
strictly as a political matter and to justify the failures of
universal inclusion by means of historical contextualization.
As Ober put it, “The limitation of the franchise to freeborn
males is certainly undemocratic by current standards, but
to deny the name democracy to Athens’ government, on the
grounds that the Athenians did not recognize rights that
most western nations have granted only quite recently, is
ahistorical.”106 As a result, speaking of RoL in terms of
political equality, as Gowder does, cannot but lead to the
conclusion that in Athens access was partial and the RoL
‘weak.’
Conversely, my point is that considering the Athenian
attitude toward inclusion only in terms of political inclusion
is also “ahistorical.” My account of RoL in Athens aims at
showing that some forms of equality and access were
substantially expanded in the course of the classical period.
The fact that the Athenian solution was morally imperfect
105. See Ober & Weingast, supra note 16.
106. OBER, MASS AND ELITE, supra note 6, at 6.
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ought not to obscure the fact that it was certainly better
than the alternatives such as civil war, poverty, and
immiseration–i.e., the conditions of much of the developing
world where the RoL (whatever its definition) has proven
hard to implement.
The Athenian approach to RoL, therefore, may point to
a way forward—one that does not achieve Gowder’s ideal of
full equality but which drives in that direction, while at the
same time contributing significantly to the provision of
important public goods such as peace and prosperity.
Such formulation of the nature and role of the RoL may
at times allow for some very disturbing moments—for
example, Berlusconi avoiding jail, threatening to bring
down the government, and asking the President of the
Republic for an amnesty on account of service rendered . . .
all the same time! However, those moments may be the
price of choosing non-civil war and prosperity over an all-ornothing struggle for perfect equality here and now.

